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Abstract-The safeguarding methodology currently used in the chemical industry is based on controlling 
the instantaneous values of the process state variables within a certain operating window, the process being 
brought to shut-down when the operating constraints are exceeded. It is concluded from an analysis of 
runaways which occurred in industrial reactors that this safeguarding methodology does not necessarily 
prevent reactor systems suffering from a runaway because (a) excessive amounts of unreacted chemicals can 
still accumulate in the process, and (b) no means are provided to the operating personnel of identifying such 
hazardous process deviations during dynamic operations. A model-based start-up and safeguarding proce- 
dure is developed for an industrial adiabatic tubular reactor to improve process safety during start-up 
operations. The trajectories of the manipulated variables are optimized by minimizing the breakthrough of 
one of the main reactants in the reactor effluent. A maximum reactor temperature constraint is also taken 
into account. It is concluded that a proper control of the initial reactor temperature profile is critical for a 
safe reactor start-uu while the imDact of the other manipulated variables is relatively small in comparison to 
the effect of the initial reactor timperature profile. 
1. KNTRODUCTION 
The safety record of the chemical industry is generally 
good in comparison with other industries (Lees, 
1991). Nevertheless incidents involving hazardous 
chemical reactions continue to happen (Hancock, 
1992) and the consequences of such incidents may 
be dramatic due to the resulting loss of human life 
and/or the scale of property damage (Garrison, 
1988; Mahoney, 1990, 1993). Therefore, many stu- 
dies have been carried out on reactive chemicals 
hazard assessment resulting in guidelines for batch 
and semi-batch reactor design, control and operation 
[see e.g. the IChemE guideline edited by Barton and 
Rogers (1993)]. 
The research for continuously-operated tubular 
reactors has almost been limited to thermal runaway 
prevention in (cooled) fixed-bed reactors. In this 
domain the works of Hosten and Froment (1986), 
Morbidelli and Varma (1989), Bauman et al. (1990) 
and Raghaven (1992) can be mentioned, without 
being exhaustive. It resulted in design criteria to 
detect operating regions of parametrically sensitive 
behavior. In parametrically sensitive operating 
regions, relatively small changes in reactor inlet con- 
ditions or other physical parameters can lead to large 
excursions in the operating conditions (= runaway 
behavior). 
Unfortunately the research on thermal runaway 
phenomena in (cooled) fixed-bed tubular reactors is 
‘To whom correspondence should be addressed 
limited to model calculations only. A comparison of 
the theoretical results with experimental data from 
industrial reactors is not available because too few 
incidents have been thoroughly documented in the 
open literature for research purposes. 
The dynamic behavior of an industrial continu- 
ously-operated adiabatic tubular reactor is described 
in this article. Experimental data of a reactor start-up 
and of a thermal runaway are used to demonstrate 
some problems which may be experienced during 
such events. These examples will also be used to 
demonstrate that the safeguarding methodology com- 
monly used in the chemical industry does not neces- 
sarily prevent an exothermic chemical reactor from a 
runaway. 
2. RUNAWAY BEHAVIOR CLASSIFICATION 
In this study a runaway is defined as a large excur- 
sion from the expected operating conditions of a 
reactor, like temperature, pressure or material com- 
position. This definition is much broader than that of 
the thermal runaway phenomena usually referred to. 
The definition is extended because upsets in continu- 
ously-operated reactor systems can have a serious 
safety impact on other units in the process, and vice 
versa. For example, many continuously-operated 
industrial reactors require a complete conversion of 
one of the main reactants at the reactor exit to avoid 
the formation of mixtures of reactive chemicals in 
process equipment which has not been designed for 
exothermal chemical reaction conditions. Hence, 
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(large) excursions from the expected reactor effluent 
composition are not allowed in such cases. 
From this process operation point of view, three 
categories of runaway behavior can be defined for 
continuously-operated (tubular) reactor systems. 
Runaway from (close to) normal steady-state 
conditions The major risk for a runaway from 
(close to) normal steady-state conditions originates 
from equipment failures, control failures or from 
flow maldistribution effects because a tubular reactor 
is operated normally in a region which is not sensitive 
to runaway behavior to maintain the process econom- 
ics (Westerterp et al., 1984; Westerterp and Ptasinski, 
1984; Westerterp and Overtoom, 1985; Westerink and 
Westerterp, 1988). An industrial example, including 
some experimental data, is reported by Eigenberger 
and Wegerle (1982). They observed a thermal run- 
away reaction in an adiabatic packed-bed reactor in 
which liquid hydrocarbons were partially hydroge- 
nated. The runaway was caused by obstructions in 
the packed bed which led to areas with abnormally 
high fluid residence times where the reaction could 
proceed up to total methanation. 
Runaway from expected process trajectories during 
dynamic operations The dynamic behavior of a pro- 
cess system is a function of the initial process condi- 
tions, process disturbances and the trajectories of the 
manipulated process variables. Hence, a runaway 
during dynamic process operations, like start-up, 
shut-down and capacity-rate changes can be initiated 
by “false” start conditions, insuffIcient control of the 
manipulated variables, flow maldistribution effects, 
equipment failures or control failures. 
Naess et al. {1993) reported some experimental data 
of serious temperature control problems in an ammo- 
nia synthesis reactor caused by control loop instabil- 
ities when the gas flow to the reactor was reduced by 
about 50%. The resulting reactor temperature oscilla- 
tions, with a maximum amplitude of about 160K, 
damaged the catalyst activity partially. 
Runaway from expected process conditions initiated 
by upsets in process sections upstream of rhe 
reactor Operational problems in other process sec- 
tions can strongly influence the quality of the reactant 
and utility feeds to the reactor which may result in 
temperature control problems, or in reactant or cata- 
lyst reactivity changes. 
No examples are known to the present authors of 
published experimental data of this type of runaway 
incidents in industrial continuously-operated tubular 
reactors. However, to stress the importance of being 
aware of this kind of process hazards, an incident 
which was experienced recently in a hydrogenation 
reactor (Shewbart, 1993) should be mentioned. This 
hydrogenation reactor suffered a thermal runaway 
while going through a catalyst regeneration sequence. 
Hydrogen gas was flowing through the catalyst bed 
for catalyst reduction. At the same time the hydrogen 
plant had an upset and hydrocarbons entered the 
hydrogen feed stream into this reactor. The result 
was an excessive temperature rise in the catalyst bed. 
3. INDUSTRIAL PROCESS 
The adiabatic reactor is shown schematically in 
Fig. 1, together with its upstream and downstream 
process sections. The process is shown in a simplified 
non-heat-integrated form in order not to reveal con- 
fidential information. In this reactor the products, 
denoted by C, are formed by an exothermal liquid 
phase reaction between the reactants A and B: 
A+B+C 
Reactant A is fed from storage into a buffer tank, 
which also receives recycled material from a recovery 
unit. Reactant A is fed from the buffer tank into the 
reactor together with reactant B, which is fed from 
storage. The adiabatic reactor system consists of a 
feed mixer, a preheater and a series of seven vessels 
with batTIes, of which only one vessel is shown in Fig. 
1 for the sake of simplicity. A detailed description of 
this plant reactor is presented by Verwijs et al. (1992). 
The performance of this reactor indicates that it can 
be characterized as a tubular reactor. Reactant A is 
fed in excess because reactant B should be totally 
converted at the reactor exit to avoid the formation 
of reactive chemical mixtures elsewhere in the process. 
The excess amount of reactant A is recovered from 
the reactor effluent and recirculated into the inter- 
mediate storage tank. The entire reactant A recovery 
section is represented by a single distillation column in 
Fig. 1. The crude product is discharged from the 
recovery unit into the product refining section. 
The reactant B flow rate is controlled by a valve in 
the B feed line at a setpoint defined by a production 
capacity target. The reactant A flow rate is controlled 
in ratio with the reactant B flow by a valve in the 
reactor effluent line. The reactor emuent flow rate is 
recorded only. The reactor inlet temperature is con- 
trolled by a valve in the steam supply line to the 
preheater at a setpoint which corresponds with the 
total feed rate into the reactor. The temperature 
along the reactor is recorded by nine thermoele- 
ments, which are located at several positions between 
the reactor inlet (z = 0) and outlet (z = 1). The loca- 
tions of the control valves, the flow devices (F) and 
some thermoelements (T) are also indicated in Fig. 1. 
3.1. Conventional safeguarding methodology 
The plant reactor is safeguarded at normal operat- 
ing conditions with respect to mass flow by monitor- 
ing: 
The actual reactant B flow rate into the reactor 
versus the flow setpoint. 
The actual flow-ratio of reactant A and B into the 
reactor versus the flow-ratio setpoint. 
The mass balance over the entire reactor by com- 
paring the mass-flow of both reactant feed streams 
with the reactor effluent stream. 
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Fig. 1. Process scheme. 
Additionally, the adiabatic reactor is safeguarded 
with respect to temperature by monitoring: 
The reactor inlet temperature versus the inlet tem- 
perature setpoint (A@,). 
The adiabatic temperature rise over the entire 
reactor versus a target value (A&d) which 
depends on the flow-ratio of reactant A and B in 
the reactor feed. 
The temperature difference over the tail-end sec- 
tion of the reactor versus a maximum allowable 
value (A&) which corresponds with the total 
reactant B conversion requirement and takes tem- 
perature measurement inaccuracies into account. 
The reactor temperatures at all thermoelement 
locations versus a maximum and a minimum 
allowable reactor temperature constraint (Q,,, 
and emin). 
A typical, steady-state temperature profile over the 
entire reactor length z is shown in Fig. 2. The dimen- 
sionless temperature B rises from a value of about 0.98 
at the inlet up to about 1.30 at the exit. Reactant B has 
been converted totally at about z = 0.8, which is indi- 
cated by the flat temperature profile between z = 0.8 
Reactant A 
recovery 
To Product 
Refining 
and z = 1 .O. The above-mentioned temperature safe- 
guarding items are indicated as well in Fig. 2. To the 
authors’ best knowledge, such a safeguarding strategy 
is quite common in the chemical industry. Of course, 
different measures from those mentioned above may 
be used for a particular reactor system, but the key 
issue of controlling the instantaneous values of the 
process state variables within a certain operating win- 
dow will be the same. 
4. EXAMPLE 1: RUNAWAY FROM STEADY-STATE 
CONDITIONS 
This plant reactor suffered a thermal runaway 
(Verwijs et al., 1994a, 1994b). Experimental data 
had been collected of the reactant A feed, the reactant 
B feed and the reactor effluent flow rate. These flow 
data are presented as a function of the dimensionless 
time ~7 in Fig. 3. The data are expressed as a percentage 
of the range of the individual flowmeters in order to 
not reveal confidential information. The reactant A 
flow device failed at time D F= 0.47 resulting in an 
erroneous flow measurement. This flowmeter indi- 
cated that the flow rate started rising slowly to the 
maximum range of the device. The ratio controller 
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Fig. 2. Observed steady-state temperature profile over the reactor length z. 
responded to this increasing flow signal by closing the 
reactant A flow control valve in the reactor efluent 
line, which can bc seen from the total reactor effluent 
flow data in Fig. 3. During this event the reactant B 
flow rate was maintained at its setpoint value. As a 
result, the reactants were fed in a wrong ratio into the 
reactor. The process control computer stopped the 
reactant B feed to the reactor at time 0 x 1.3 due to 
a low reactor inlet temperature. 
The responses of the nine thermoelements along the 
entire reactor length are shown in Fig. 4. The time at 
which the reactant A flow device failed, and at which 
the reactant B pump was stopped, are marked with a 
vertical solid line in Figs 3 and 4. The thermoelements 
at z =0.39, 2 = 0.49, z=O.60 and z=0.70 
responded very quickly to the flow device failure. 
The reactor temperatures at these locations increased 
because of the decreasing total flow rate through the 
system and the reactant ratio change. Note that it 
took a time interval Au ti 0.8 before the reactor 
inlet temperature exceeded the minimum reactor 
inlet temperature constraint and the reactant B feed 
pump was stopped. 
The thermal runaway was initiated by a failing flow 
device. The failure was observed by the process con- 
trol computer which compares the mass-flow of both 
reactant feed streams with the reactor effluent stream. 
The process control computer did not shut down the 
reactor system automatically but only gave an alarm. 
At that point in time the operators were not aware of 
the upcoming runaway because all reactor tempera- 
tures were still in the normal operating range, and 
they restarted the reactant B feed pump to return to 
the normal operating conditions [see Verwijs et al. 
(1994a) for details]. Later on, when the operators 
noted the imminent runaway, they responded very 
proficiently to the emergency situation. They kept 
the reactant A pump running and closed the control 
valve in the reactor effluent line to pressurize the 
system. In this way evaporation of reactant B from 
4 
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Fig. 3. Observed reactant A, reactant B and total flow as a function of time during the temperature runaway. 
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Fig. 4. Observed reactor temperature as a function of time at various reactor locations z during the temperature runaway. 
the liquid phase was prevented and almost no reactant 
B was released into the downstream process section. 
4.1. Learning experiences of Example I 
When assessing the hazards associated with 
exothermic chemical reactions it is essential to deter- 
mine how much reactant accumulates in the process. 
Excessive amounts of accumulated reactants will 
cause high reaction rates and consequently high heat 
production rates, or in this particular case an exces- 
sive adiabatic temperature rise. Correct flow control 
and mass balance control is only one aspect of reac- 
tant accumulation prevention. It must be kept in mind 
that instruments and control devices will fail even- 
tually. Therefore the question of redundancy for con- 
trol system components must be considered 
thoroughly; this problem as such is beyond the 
scope of this study. Some guidelines for selecting the 
appropriate level of redundancy are given by Englund 
and Grinwis (1992). 
As mentioned above, a process is usually safe- 
guarded by controlling the instantaneous values of 
the process state variables within certain operating 
windows, and corrective actions are taken when the 
value of a process state variable exceeds a certain 
constraint. Usually these operations are executed 
automatically by hard-wired emergency shutdown 
systems when the process safety constraints are 
exceeded. 
As can be seen from Figs 3 and 4, the mass balance 
control of the reactor failed at (T ~ij 0.47, but the sys- 
tem was able to maintain the reactor temperatures 
within the selected temperature constraints until 
0 = 1.3. During this period reactant B accumulated 
in the system. As a result the temperature rise could 
no longer be stopped by the operating personnel when 
the reactor temperature exceeded the maximum tem- 
perature constraint due to the heat of reaction. This 
aspect is the key difference with process units in which 
no exothermic reaction is carried out. For such units 
the heat input into the system can be stopped as soon 
5523 
as a maximum temperature constraint is exceeded and 
the process temperature will return to normal operat- 
ing conditions. In the reactor incident case studied, 
the possible maximum temperature rise is determined 
by the amount of reactants accumulated in the sys- 
tem. Hence, when the reactor temperature exceeded 
the maximum allowable temperature constraint, and 
the heat input and/or the reactant feeds were stopped, 
the system did not return to the normal operating 
conditions and the thermal runaway proceeded. 
It can be concluded from this thermal runaway 
example that controlling the instantaneous values of 
the process state variables within certain operating 
windows is not sufficient to prevent the system from 
a runaway, because if one line of defence fails (in this 
example mass balance control) the other line of 
defence (temperature control) does not necessarily 
take over in time. 
This thermal runaway would not have occurred if 
the flow meter had not failed. Hence, in industrial 
practice people focus on installing the appropriate 
level of redundancy for process control system com- 
ponents (Englung and Grinwis, 1992). In this way, it 
becomes much more difficult to pass the lines of 
defence based on mass or heat balance 
(temperature) control. Of course, a properly installed 
and a sufficiently redundant safeguarding system will 
reduce the risks for runaways to a large extent at 
normal steady-state operating conditions. So one 
could argue that the safeguarding strategy seems to 
be sufficient when the mass balance control system is 
in good order. 
But this is not necessarily the case, as can be 
explained by comparing the above-described safe- 
guarding strategy with the runaway modes and 
causes defined in the previous section. The thermal 
runaway example in the hydrogen reactor during 
the catalyst regeneration sequence (Shewbart, 1993) 
could not have been prevented by proper mass bal- 
ance control. In this case the mass balance over the 
reactor would have been measured to be in good 
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order but the reactivity of the reactants changed dur- 
ing the catalyst reduction step. This reactant reactiv- 
ity change can only be detected by controlling the 
energy balance and/or the temperature profile over 
the entire reactor in conjunction with the reactor 
mass balance. Also, the thermal runaway due to 
flow maldistribution effects (Eigenberger and 
Wegerle, 1982) could not have been prevented by 
proper mass balance control only. In such circum- 
stances, an imminent runaway can be detected only 
by controlling the temperature profile over the entire 
reactor in conjunction with the reactor mass balance. 
The key issue of the safeguarding strategy described 
is that the mass and heat balances over the reactor are 
uncoupled by controlling the reactant flows and some 
reactor temperatures as such within certain operating 
windows. Due to this aspect no online information is 
available about the extent of the reaction taking place, 
and reactants can accumulate relatively easily in the 
system, especially at abnormal process conditions. 
Hence, to avoid an unexpected reactant accumula- 
tion in the system the temperature profile along the 
entire reactor length has to be included in the reactor 
safeguarding strategy. Also, the spatially distributed 
nature of the process conditions over the entire reac- 
tor length complicates considerably the implementa- 
tion of a control and safeguarding system based on 
the reactor temperature profile, because the tempera- 
ture profile depends on the reactor operating condi- 
tions, such as total flow, reactant ratio and reactor 
inlet temperature. Therefore, a model-based process 
control and safeguarding system is required to control 
the reactor mass balance in conjunction with the reac- 
tor heat balance. In this way, online information can 
be obtained from the model about the extent of the 
reaction, even at abnormal process conditions. 
5. EXAMPLE 2: RUNAWAY DURING START-UP 
OPERATIONS 
In reality the reactant A recovery system is much 
more complex than shown in Fig. 1 and highly heat- 
integrated. Also, no auxiliary systems were available 
to operate the recovery system before the reactor was 
started up. Hence, the reactor and the reactant A 
recovery unit were started up simultaneously. 
The entire process system was prepared for start-up 
by filling the system via the normal flow route with a 
mixture of reactant A and product C. The material is 
heated up in the reactor preheater simultaneously. 
These operations were executed before the actual 
start-up; see also Verwijs et al. (1992, 1994a, 1994b). 
The reactor start-up procedure followed was to feed 
reactant B into the reactor as soon as the reactant A 
flow rate and the reactor inlet temperature reached the 
target values used at normal steady-state conditions, 
in order to minimize the amount of offgrade material 
produced during start-up operations. 
Experimental data on the reactant A and B flows, 
and the reactor pressure, are shown in Fig. 5 as a 
function of the dimensionless time u. The data are 
expressed as a percentage of the range of the particu- 
lar pressure and flow measurement devices. The time 
D is scaled by taking the time origin (a = 0) just before 
reactant B is added into the system (Verwijs et al., 
1992). As a result of this time origin choice, time 1~ 
appears to be negative in Figs 5 and 6. The dimension- 
less temperature 13 over the entire reactor is shown in 
Fig. 6. In this figure, the lines parallel to the u-axis 
represent the response of the individual thermoele- 
ments at the dimensionless location z, and the lines 
parallel to the z-axis connect the data at the same 
moment. The z-axis is scaled from z = 0 at the reac- 
tor inlet to z = 1 at the exit. Note that in Fig. 6, the (T- 
axis is drawn from the right side to the left. 
iif? 
B ii 
Fig. 
LIOO 
50- reactant A 
-2 -1 0 1 
(T (-) 
5. Observed reactor pressure and flow of reactants A and B as a function of time. 
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Fig. 6. Observed reactor temperature versus reactor location and time. 
The operations executed to till the system with 
process material are completed before the period of 
time of which the data are presented. The temperature 
profile ~9 over the entire reactor length z at time 
0 = -2.0 in Fig. 6 resulted from these operations. 
During the period o = -2.0 until u = - 1.27, the reac- 
tor is waiting for the next operational action. At 
D = -1.27, virginal reactant A is fed into the reac- 
tor; see Fig. 5. The system was not completely filled 
up with liquid at that time, and the reactant A flow 
was raised initially to maximum capacity until the 
reactor pressure reached the normal operating 
value. During the period c = -1.27 until u = -0.14 
relatively cold material entered the reactor. At 
u = -0.14 steam is fed into the feed preheater to 
control the reactor inlet temperature. All these pro- 
cess manipulations resulted in the initial temperature 
profile 0 at (T = 0 shown in Fig. 6. 
The reactor behavior from (T = 0 and onwards is 
shown in Figs 7 and 8. At u = 0.10, the feed-pump 
of reactant B is started up (see Fig. 7). During the 
period ~7 = 1.47 until ~7 = 1.70, no reactant B is fed 
into the system due to a pump failure. The reactant B 
feed-pump is restarted at 0 = 1.70. At c = 3.00, the 
reactor feed is ramped up to a minimum plant capa- 
city which is reached at g = 5.50. The resulting tem- 
perature profile B over the entire reactor from time 
o = 0 and onwards is shown in Fig. 8. 
5. I. Learning experiences of Example 2 
As mentioned before, a breakthrough of reactant B 
in the reactor effluent is not allowed for process safety 
reasons. However, it was observed that significant 
amounts of reactant B could end up in the reactor 
effluent by applying the start-up methodology 
described above. Therefore, a modeling study was 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
D (-) 
Fig. 7. Observed flow of reactants A and B as a function of time. 
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Fig. 8. Observed reactor temperature versus reactor location and time. 
performed on the start-up behavior of this reactor 
(Verwijs et al., 1992). The calculated concentration 
profile of reactant B as a function of time u over the 
entire reactor length .z is shown in Fig. 9. In this figure 
the lines parallel to the u-axis represent the catculated 
dimensionless concentration I?s at the dimensionless 
location z, and the lines parallel to the z-axis connect 
the data at the same moment. The u-axis is drawn 
from the right side to the left side, and the t-axis is 
drawn in opposite direction, which contradicts with 
the temperature profile in Fig. 8. Note the break- 
through of component B around time cr = 2 in Fig. 
9 ( = runaway from expected reactor effluent compo- 
sition!). 
If the restart of the reactant B feed-pump after the 
pump failure is considered as a second start-up, a 
significant difference can be observed in the reactant 
B concentration profiles in Fig. 9. This difference 
stems from the following two reasons: 
l The average reactor temperature during the sec- 
ond start-up is much higher than for the first one. 
l The reactant B feed is not ramped to its setpoint 
during the second start-up; see Fig. 7. 
The combination of these effects results in a higher 
average reaction rate due to a higher initial tempera- 
ture level and a higher initial concentration of reac- 
tant B for the second start-up, resulting in a complete 
conversion of reactant B at z x 0.60. 
It can be concluded that for an adiabatic tubular 
reactor a much higher initial temperature along the 
reactor is required during start-up, compared to the 
'0 
Fig. 9. Calculated reactant B concentration versus reactor location and time. 
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reactor inlet temperature at normal steady-state con- 
ditions, to ensure a complete reactant B conversion at 
the reactor exit. Although, by starting up according to 
the policy just described, the initial temperature pro- 
lile over the entire reactor is not under control! 
Secondly, the spatially distributed nature of the 
process conditions in a tubular reactor highly compli- 
cates the reactor safeguarding during start-up opera- 
tions. This can be explained by focusing again on the 
reactor temperature profile shown in Fig. 2. At 
steady-state conditions the reactor is safeguarded by 
monitoring the reactor inlet temperature (A&), the 
isothermal operation at the tail end of the reactor 
(A@,,) and the adiabatic temperatute rise (A&d). 
Additionally the reactor temperature is observed ver- 
sus a maximum and minimum temperature constraint 
(LIX and &in). The safeguarding elements A& and 
A&d are initially of no use when reactant B is intro- 
duced into the system to start up the reactor because 
the normal temperature profile does not exist. 
Therefore, in industrial practice such safeguarding 
elements are not taken care of during the start-up, 
because they may generate unreasonable reactor shut- 
downs. As a result, all safeguarding items which may 
give some indication about the extent of the reaction 
(A&,, and A&d) are missing and operational pro- 
blems may easily arise during the start-up, as has 
been demonstrated in Figs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Finally, the observation of a few key state variables 
is often sufficient for experienced operating personnel 
to control the process status at steady-state conditions 
(Verwijs et al., 1994a). A reactor is supervised in the 
same way by operating personnel. They use the read- 
ings of the reactant feed rates together with the values 
of some thermoelements to control the status of the 
reactor. However, the spatially distributed nature and 
the transient behavior of the temperature readings 
along the reactor make it significantly more compli- 
cated for plant operating personnel, in comparison 
with reactor safeguarding at steady-state conditions 
(a) to identify important process deviations during 
dynamic operations, and (b) to recognize when a 
process is running into hazardous situations. Again, 
a model-based control system, based on the reactor 
mass and heat balance, may provide a solution to this 
problem as will be shown in the next sections. 
6. START-UP STRATEGY DESIGN 
Verwijs et al. (1994a) presented a sequence of ele- 
mentary intermediate operating states for the start-up 
of a continuously-operated adiabatic tubular reactor 
by taking into account the operational aspects of an 
entire process section. Four consecutive steps are 
determined to drive the reactor system from shut- 
down to the normal production state: 
l Firstly, reactant A should be recycled over the 
entire process section. This process recycle loop 
should include the reactor feed system, the reac- 
tor, and the recovery system. 
Secondly, the reactant A recovery system should 
be driven to production state conditions, so the 
recovery system can treat the reactor effluent with- 
out significant process upsets after the start-up of 
the reactant B feed into the reactor. 
Thirdly, the reactor temperature should be driven 
(simultaneously) to the required initial tempera- 
ture S(z,O) at which reactant B can be fed into 
the reactor safely. 
Finally, reactant B should be supplied into the 
reactor to start production. 
The following approach is chosen to study the reactor 
start-up (Verwijs et al., 1994b), which is also shown 
schematically in Fig. 10. In the process conditioning 
state (step 3 of the above-mentioned sequence of oper- 
ating stages) reactant A is fed at a flow rate FA(O) into 
the reactor. The reactant A flow is kept at this rate 
during the start-up of the reactant B feed pump. The 
reactant B feed pump is initially not in service, so the 
reactant B flow rate FB(O) = 0. The entire reactor is 
assumed to be at the required initial temperature level 
19(z, 0). The temperature profile L~(z, 0) is assumed to 
be uniform over the entire reactor length z. 
At time D = ua, the reactant B feed pump is put into 
service, and the reactant B flow is increased from zero 
to Fe( 1) at a constant rate in a period Acri. The flow 
rate Fs( 1) is chosen according to the required FA/FB 
flow-ratio, to control the reactant B concentration at 
the reactor entrance to satisfy the product mix speci- 
fications. 
The reactor inlet temperature r/~ has to be decreased 
from the initial value .9(z,O) to the normal reactor 
inlet temperature e(O, a), starting at time as + Aa2 
at a rate oi. The entire process section is driven to 
the required production capacity target at time 
as + Aus by increasing the reactant B flow rate 
from FB( 1) to FB(2) at a rate CQ. The flow-ratio .$ 
will be kept constant during this capacity rate 
increase. 
In Section 5 it is demonstrated qualitatively that for 
an adiabatic tubular reactor a much higher initial 
reactor temperature is required during the start-up, 
compared to the reactor inlet temperature at normal 
steady-state conditions, to ensure a complete reactant 
B conversion at the reactor exit during the start-up 
(see Figs 5-9). Therefore, questions to be addressed 
are: 
What is the appropriate initial temperature e(z, 0) 
at which reactant B can be introduced into the 
reactor? 
According to which trajectory should the reactor 
inlet temperature ve be decreased from the over- 
heated initial temperature 0(z,O) to the normal 
reactor inlet temperature 0(0, a)? 
At which total flow rate 4” can the reactor be 
started up safely? 
How fast can reactant B be introduced into the 
reactor? 
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Fig. 10. Schematic representation of the manipulated variable trajectories during the reactor start-up. 
A dynamic model of this industrial adiabatic tubular 
reactor is presented by Venvijs et al. (1992, 1994b) in 
which the total reaction scheme has been simplified to 
one reaction, describing the consumption of reactant 
B. This reaction is assumed to be irreversible and of 
first order with an Arrhenius-type rate constant. The 
deviation of plug flow in the reactor had been 
described by axial dispersion, while all physical prop- 
erties of the fluid were assumed to be constant over 
the entire reactor length. The energy take-up in the 
reactor vessel is included in the model, but the heat 
take-up in the insulation blanket and heat losses to 
the surroundings has been neglected. 
This model is used to calculate the optimal trajec- 
tories of the manipulated variables by taking into 
account the operation objective of minimizing the 
total amount of reactant B fed to the recovery section 
during the reactor start-up. Constraints taken into 
account simultaneously are: (a) the capacity of the 
reactor feed preheater is limited; (b) the total flow 
rate is constrained by the range of the flow control 
valve in the reactor effluent line; and (c) the maximum 
operating temperature of the reactor should not 
exceed the maximum allowable reactor temperature 
value &,, = 1.35. Some modeling results for a start- 
up at a rate of 50% of the total plant capacity are 
shown in Figs 11 and 12 [see Verwijs et al. (1994b) 
for further details]. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the dynamic 
modeling and optimization study: 
l To maximize the reaction rate at initial start-up 
conditions reactant B is introduced into the reac- 
tor as fast as possible and the initial reactor tem- 
perature is driven to its upper extreme 
simultaneously. 
1.25 A 
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Fig. I1 _ Calculated reactor temperature versus reactor location and time 
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Fig. 12. Calculated reactant B concentration versus reactor location and time. 
To compensate for the reaction rate decline by (a) 
the energy take-up in the reactor vessel and (b) the 
elongation of the reactant B concentration profile 
and the reactor temperature profile due to mass 
and heat dispersion effects, the reactor should be 
overheated at initial start-up conditions. This 
additional heat input is determined by the shaded 
area in Fig.10. This excess heat input into the 
reactor is maximized by taking into account the 
maximum allowable reactor temperature con- 
straint. 
A parameter sensitivity analysis showed that the 
objective of minimizing the total amount of reactant 
B in the reactor effluent is controlled mainly by the 
initial reactor temperature. This is an important result 
because now it is possible to design a feasible reactor 
start-up strategy. As stated before, in the process 
conditioning step the reactor is driven to the initial 
reactor temperature 0(z, 0). This operation as such is 
independent of the introduction of reactant B into the 
reactor and can be carried out very easily in a properly 
designed process (Verwijs et al., 1994a). 
7. IMPROVED START-UP SAFEGUARDING STRATEGY 
Conventionally, the reactor is safeguarded by 
supervising the instantaneous values of the process 
state variables within a certain operating window. It 
is shown in Section 5.1 that this methodology is not 
sufficient for chemical reactor systems because all 
items which may give some information about the 
extent of the reaction are missing during transient 
operations. Another shortcoming is that this metho- 
dology is not suitable for identification of imminent 
hazardous process conditions during process transi- 
ents. Therefore an improved safeguarding methodol- 
ogy should provide a procedure (a) to control the 
manipulated variables and (b) to supervise the result- 
ing dynamic reactor behavior. 
This functionality can be introduced by control- 
ling the actual manipulated variable trajectories ver- 
sus the optimal trajectories calculated by the model. 
Subsequently, maximum allowable deviations from 
the optimal trajectories have to be determined to 
compensate for process disturbances and model mis- 
match. In an analogous way, the actual responses of 
the thermoelements located along the reactor can be 
monitored versus the optimal trajectories calculated 
by the reactor model, and constraints can also be 
defined to compensate for process disturbances and 
model mismatch. Now the operating personnel have 
a method to supervise the dynamic reactor behavior 
versus a target response. Consequently the reactor 
should be brought into a shut-down step when these 
constraints are exceeded to prevent the process from 
running into a hazardous situation. 
The temperature trajectory constraints are repre- 
sented by the dashed lines in Fig. 13 at several 
positions z along the reactor. These results are 
obtained by varying the initial reactor temperature 
e(z, 0) starting from the optimal conditions at 
Q(z,O) = 1.08. The upper constraints are deter- 
mined by the maximum allowable reactor tempera- 
ture. The lower temperature constraint is 
determined by the maximum allowable reactant B 
breakthrough. So, the temperature range available 
between these constraints is available for a safe 
reactor start-up. 
The methodology described above can also be used 
during the design of a reactor system. Now the max- 
imum allowable reactor temperature @,,, and the 
maximum initial reactor temperature e(z,O) can be 
used as design parameters to enlarge the range 
between the upper and lower temperature con- 
straints. Enlarging this temperature range will 
decrease the impact of process disturbances and 
model mismatch on process safety during the reactor 
start-up. 
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Fig. 13. Reactor temperature trajectory constraints for themmelements located at several positions along the reactor length t. 
In practice, the period of time up to the first max- 
imum in the temperature trajectories is of major inter- 
est for safeguarding of the reactor start-up. After this 
period, the conventional safeguarding system can 
take over when no online model-based control and 
safeguarding system is available. For this particular 
period of time the expected thermoelement responses 
and their related constraints can be characterized very 
well by the equations which describe the response of a 
second-order system, with delay and complex conju- 
gate roots of the characteristic equation, to a step 
change at the inlet of the system (Kuo, 1991). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The process safeguarding methodology used in the 
current industrial practice is based on controlling the 
instantaneous values of the process state variables 
within certain operating windows. If the safety con- 
straints are exceeded the process is brought into shut- 
down. Usually, these operations are executed 
automatically by hard-wired emergency shutdown 
systems. It is demonstrated, by using information of 
thermal runaways which occurred in industrial con- 
tinuously-operated tubular reactors, that such a safe- 
guarding system does not necessarily prevent a 
reactor from a runaway because excessive amounts 
of unreacted chemicals can still accumulate in the 
reactor system. A model-based control and safe- 
guarding system is required to control the reactor 
mass balance in conjunction with the reactor heat 
balance. In this way online information can be 
obtained from the model about the extent of the reac- 
tion, even at abnormal process conditions. 
A dynamic model of an industrial adiabatic tubular 
reactor is used to develop an improved safeguarding 
strategy for start-up operations. Two safety con- 
straints are taken into account: (a) one of the main 
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reactants has to be totally converted at the reactor exit 
to avoid hazardous situations in a downstream pro- 
cess section; and (b) the reactor temperature should 
never exceed a maximum allowable reactor tempera- 
ture constraint. 
It is concluded for the operating conditions studied 
that a proper control of the initial reactor temperature 
is critical for a safe reactor start-up. Hence, a process 
conditioning state for the reactor system should be 
included in the start-up procedure, and should be 
made feasible by a proper plant design. 
UO (a0 = 0.1); point in time at which reactant B 
is introduced into the reactor 
API reactant B start-up rate parameter 
Au2 delay period before the reactor inlet tempera- 
ture is ramped down 
Aa3 delay period before the flow rate is increased 
to the required plant capacity target 
The optimum initial reactor temperature condi- 
tions and manipulated variable trajectories are used 
to determine a range of operating conditions in which 
the reactor can be started up safely. The temperature 
trajectories measured by the particular thermoele- 
ments located along the reactor can be fairly well 
described by the response of a second order system 
to a step response. Such equations can be implemen- 
ted relatively easily in modern process control systems 
for process safeguarding purposes. Additionally, 
operating personnel can use such target trajectories 
to identify imminent hazardous situations during 
start-up operations. 
CB 
CB,? 
L 
P 
t 
T 
To 
Tr 
VI 
concentration of species B, mol/m3 
reference concentration of species 5, mol/m3 
reactor length, m 
(P/Pr>; system pressure expressed as percen- 
tage of device range, % 
time, s 
fluid temperature, K 
fluid temperature at reactor inlet, K 
reference temperature, K 
superficial fluid velocity at reference condi- 
tions, m/s 
x length coordinate in direction of flow, m 
‘? {x/L}; dimensionless reactor length 
NOTATION 
Greek Letters 
‘y2 
rB 
E 
e 
e max 
Qmin 
A&d 
Agin 
A& 
reactor inlet temperature decrease rate para- 
meter 
flow rate increase parameter 
{ CB/Ce, r}; dimensionless concentration reac- 
tant B 
flow-ratio of reactants A and B in the reactor 
feed 
{T/T,}; dimensionless fluid temperature 
maximum allowable reactor temperature 
minimum allowable reactor temperature 
dimensionless adiabatic temperature rise 
maximum allowable deviation of reactor inlet 
temperature setpoint 
maximum allowable temperature difference 
over the reactor tail-end section at normal 
operating conditions 
{ To/T,}; dimensionless reactor inlet tempera- 
ture 
{v,r/L); dimensionless time 
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